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Abstract 
Concern for board of directors considerably increased with the recent developments in the corporate governance 
field. Despite that extensive research was conducted, the understanding of the board and its effects is still limited. 
This is mainly because that the majority of the corporate governance research focused mostly on the direct relation of 
board characteristics with organizational outcomes, and neglected the effect of intervening variables, leading to 
inconclusive research findings. Deriving on this limitation, in this study, the effect of board composition on 
organizational performance was investigated for different environmental conditions, which are measured in terms of 
munificence and dynamism of the industry in which the organizations operate and product complexity of the 
organizations. In addition, the moderating effects of these dimensions of organizational task environments on the 
relationship between board composition and organizational performance were also addressed. Building on resource 
dependence theory, it is suggested that under different environmental conditions, different compositions of boards 
will positively influence organizational performance. Based on the data from 80 companies which shares are publicly 
traded in østanbul Stock Exchange, the findings indicate that the effect of board composition on organizational 
performance vary among different environmental conditions.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility 7th International 
Strategic Management Conference 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization and liberalization of financial markets, corporate governance scandals and increasing 
demands of stakeholders for accountability and transparency of organizations, brought the roles and tasks 
of board of directors (BODs) to the center of corporate governance debate [1]. Not only, high profile 
corporate scandals and failures of the recent history, but also the recent global financial crisis are mainly 
related to the activities of the boards. Since BODs are viewed to be a fundamental component of corporate 
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governance; developments in the corporate governance field encouraged BODs concern for organizational 
strategy which was previously controlled by the General Manager of the organization [2]. This is therefore 
an indication of the vitality of boards [3] who are the final institutional decision makers [4].  
BODs have various and important roles [5]. According to Zahra and Pearce [6], the main roles of 
BODs are control, service and strategy. Realization of these roles mainly depends on the characteristics of 
boards [7], which affect the financial performance of organizations. Daily, Johnson and Dalton [8] 
identified more than 20 definitions of board structure, which researchers encountered in the literature. 
However, most researchers concentrated on the three most important characteristics of BODs, which are 
leadership structure, board size and board composition [9]. The view that board characteristics are 
important determinants of organizational performance is widely accepted [6, 10, 12]. Although, this is an 
enduring topic in the literature, no consensus exists whether there is a substantive relation between the 
characteristics of BODs and the performance of their organizations. Research reviews and meta-analyses 
consistently indicate equivocal relationships between board composition, leadership structure and 
organizational performance [6, 11, 12, 13]. 
This research stream considerably emphasized the direct impact of board characteristics on 
organizational performance, however neglected the intervening variables in this relation. The 
environmental context is a key contingency for the organizations, it both enhances and constraints 
organizational activities. Since different environments have different economical, technical and social 
features, the structures and strategies of the organizations operating in different environments differ from 
each other. Utilization of environmental features in the relation between board characteristics and 
organizational performance could shed valuable insight to the inconclusive findings of the previous 
research. In this study, focusing on these discussions, it was aimed to investigate the effect of board 
composition, measured in terms of insider director, outsider director and affiliated director presentation, 
on organizational performance in different industries. BODs are in general the main decision-making 
body of organizations in Turkey and they are primarily responsible for the fate of their organizations, 
therefore the study of the effect of these groups on organizational performance exists as an important 
research topic in Turkish context. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Board of Directors (BODs) has an important role in the management of organizations. Since, BODs are 
considered to be one of the important governance mechanisms, these groups are increasingly being hold 
responsible for the organizational performance. For this reason, many studies from diverse fields, 
including law, economics, finance, sociology, organizational theory and strategic management, focus on 
BODs [14].  
The performance of the organizations is dependent on the realization of the roles of BODs. These roles 
are both important and numerous [5]. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand [11] suggest that the most emphasized 
roles of BODs in the literature are control, service and resource dependence roles. The control role entails 
directors monitoring managers as fiduciaries of stockholders, hiring and firing executives and determining 
executive compensation. The service role, on the other hand, involves advising executives on 
administrative and other managerial issues as well as actively initiating and formulating strategy. Finally, 
the resource dependence role views the board as facilitating the acquisition of resources critical to firm 
success. Hillman and Dalziel [15] assert that, monitoring as well as resource providing is considered by 
BODs to be an integral part of their board activities. 
Agency theory being the dominant framework [6, 16], researchers employed various theoretical 
perspectives (i.e. stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory, stakeholder theory, institutional 
theory, resource dependence theory) for the study of BODs. Within the frame of agency theory, it is 
assumed that BODs control the opportunistic behaviors of the managers; therefore, these groups represent 
the primary internal control system that fit the interests of shareholders and managers, [17]. According to 
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Fama and Jensen [18], BODs form “the apex of internal decision control system” of the organizations; 
since they are the main control mechanism for the organizations, and are authorized for the control of 
organizational decisions. Agency theory is appropriate for the control and supervision roles of BODs. 
However, different theoretical perspectives are required for the resource provision roles of BODs, which 
is among the most important roles of board members [6, 11, 16]. The theoretical framework for such roles 
is based on resource dependence theory [19]. Consideration of these roles of BODs had resulted that a 
considerable amount of research to be undertaken within the frame of resource dependence theory. 
Resource dependence theory [19] presents an alternative to the agency theory. The theory considers 
BODs as a mechanism that reduces the environmental uncertainty [20], manage the external 
organizational dependencies [19], behave as a coaptation mean in order to ensure the resources that the 
organizations are in need of [6] and, increase organizational legitimacy [6, 19]. The primary focus of 
resource dependence theory is the fact that the organizations should interact with its environment as much 
as it is necessary. Within the frame of resource dependence theory, organizational needs to access 
environmental resources, emerge as a vital issue for the survival. Organizations are considered as an open 
system that is dependent on other organizations for the provision of important resources [19]. It is 
assumed that the success of the organizations is based on their abilities to provide and control the external 
resources [21]. The mechanisms that administer these external dependencies are BODs [19]. 
Resource dependence theorists considers BODs as, important actors who act as boundary-spanners in 
order to ensure that the managers get the necessary knowledge on time; and the groups who are beneficial 
for the provision of the resources required for organizational activities [6]. According to resource 
dependence theory, since each board member brings in different resources and network to the 
organization, BODs are selected according to their resource provision capabilities, which are important 
for the organization. Resource dependence role encourage the access to the critical assets, capabilities and 
knowledge that are critical and may otherwise unavailable to the organization [19]. Dalton and Daily [22] 
state that, resource dependence roles of BODs which forms a link to organizations’ external environment, 
are the basis for organizational success. By ensuring the access to the resources that the organizations are 
dependent on, BODs contribute to the strategic organizational decisions [15]. BODs have an important 
role of assuring essential resources from the external organizational stakeholders by their personal 
relations (19, 6, 7, 11). When BODs are appointed for their expertise, organizations can successfully cope 
with environmental uncertainty which will lead to better organizational performance. Thus, the board 
structure will be formed in accordance to resource dependencies of organizations [23]. 
Board structure refers to the formal organization of the board of directors; its major dimensions are size 
and the division of labor between the board chair and the CEO. The size of a board is straightforward, 
defined by the number of directors. CEO duality refers to the situation in which both titles are held by one 
person. In contrast to structure, the composition of a board of directors defines the affiliations of each 
director [24]. In the literature, the board composition is usually defined based on insider and outsider 
directors. Insider board members are the directors who are currently serving as company officers, whereas 
outsider board members are the directors who are “non-management members of the board” [11]. 
Outsider directors are not necessarily independent directors; some of them may have ties with the 
company or company management through family or business relations [23, 25]; thus these directors are 
affiliated with the company. Affiliated directors can form interlocking relations between the companies. 
Interlocking directorates occur in case that a board member of the organization, at the same time acts as 
the board member of another organization [19, 26]. In such a case, interlocking directorates are considered 
as a coaptation mean with the other organizations which are important for the organization [19]. In the 
literature, the research findings about the impact of all of these defined directors who forms the boards, on 
organizational performance are equivocal [12, 13]. One of the reasons of this ambiguity is that most of the 
research on board composition did not emphasize the environmental context in which the organization and 
BODs are embedded in.  
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2.1. Environmental Context 
Since the dominant theoretical framework of the research related with BODs is the agency theory, 
researchers for a long period focused on the control roles of the board members and therefore to the 
internal environment of the organization. Apart from the control roles of BODs, resource dependence 
roles of board members provide a link to the external environment [22]. Therefore, in the research on 
BODs with a resource dependence perspective, it is crucial to consider environmental dimensions in 
which the organizations operate in. The internal and external organizational conditions determine the 
composition of the characteristics of board members and as a consequence the organizational performance 
[6]. Pfeffer [20] indicate that board composition is related to the organization’s need to deal with its 
environment. However, in most of the previous research about BODs, the effect of environmental factors 
was not considered [26].  
In the recent research [27, 28], it is discussed that environmental conditions may have an effect on the 
relation between the characteristics of BODs and organizational performance. Research on the resource 
provision role of BODs indicate that one of the factors that influence board size and composition is the 
environmental uncertainty [7, 19]. In order to overcome environmental resource constraints, an 
appropriate board composition could be effective [6]. Environment is somewhat defined as “everything 
else” outside the organization [29] and it is conceptualized in terms of general and task environments [30], 
where task environment is all aspects of the organization’s environment which are potentially relevant to 
organizational goal setting and goal attainment. The task environment focuses upon the forces affecting 
the industry. Dess and Beard [31] identified three broad dimensions of organizational task environments, 
as munificence, dynamism and complexity. The authors indicate that these dimensions are important for 
decision making since they are directly related to uncertainty.  
According to Dess and Beard [31], munificence is the relative level of current resources and it 
represents the capability of the environment that foster organizational growth. In munificent 
environments, organizational concern is about different purposes but not their existence, since 
sustainability of organizational existence is relatively easier than in other types of environments [32]. 
Resource dependence theory suggests that, the need for external resources and information determine the 
degree of environmental dependence [26]. Organizations face different levels of dependencies. The 
environment is considered as a pool of resources and the degree of resource munificence is defined as 
environmental munificence [31, 32]. Munificent environments provide surplus resources [32]. Such 
environments reduce the resource dependencies [26] and the competition for the resources [31]. As a 
consequence, in munificence environments, without mergers, organizations could easily acquire resources 
for enhancing brand awareness, creating demand and achieving future growth [19]. From the resource 
dependence perspective, insider directors have the internal knowledge about the internal operations and 
business processes. According to Forbes and Milliken [33], insider directors are well acquainted, familiar 
to work together on a regular basis and have a comprehensive understanding of the organization’s 
business. Boards dominated by insiders provide a medium for decision-making [34] and conflict 
resolution [35]. Baysinger and Hoskisson [36] indicate that inside directors have the knowledge and 
information to appropriately assess strategic decisions.  
Facing scarce environmental conditions, especially top managers’ strategic decisions are based on 
fewer communication and direct control [37]. Therefore, in the environments that are not munificent, the 
effect of presentation of insider directors in the boards is more, when compared with munificent 
environments. In the environments were resources are scarce, the organizational performance will depend 
on coherent decision making. Since insider directors are familiar with the routine organizational 
operations, decisions of these directors will be much efficient. On the other hand, in munificent 
environments since the resources are abundant, organizations should be in search for alternatives. Within 
this frame, it is suggested that although insider director proportion is favorable under scarce 
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environmental conditions, in munificent environments this will not lead to better organizational 
performance. In sum, following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: In munificent environments, the effect of insider director representation on organizational 
performance is negative. 
H2: With increasing munificence, the effect of insider director representation on organizational 
performance weakens.  
Dess and Beard [31] define dynamism as the change, that is difficult to predict and which increase the 
uncertainty for the organizational members. More generally, dynamism is defined as the instability in the 
environment, the rate of change and the unpredictability of the environmental factors [38, 39]. According 
to resource dependence theory, environmental dynamism which is a key component of environmental 
uncertainty is positively related to the firm dependence on its stakeholders for critical resources [19]. In 
dynamic environments, top managers face ambiguous conditions, low levels of well-developed 
alternatives and less evaluation criteria for the selection of these alternatives [40]. Therefore, these factors 
oblige top managers to investigate evaluation of environmental conditions in a limited way, analyze rapid 
solutions for decision-making and enhance various suddenly emerging reactions. Dess and Origer [41] 
suggest that in the environments with high levels of dynamism and complexity, organizations are in need 
of more division of labor in top management teams, in order to follow the rapidly changing segments of 
the environment. 
One of the predictions of resource dependence theory is that the presence of more outsider directors 
will help to gain access to the required resources of the organization and the organizational performance 
will be better. Pfeffer and Salancik [19] indicate that outsiders provide managerial and informational skills 
that are not otherwise available to the organization, they can provide linkages to the external environment 
due to their information and resources, and they may facilitate initiatives between organizations. Boyd 
[26] and Hillman et al [23] suggest that during conditions of environmental uncertainty, organizations are 
likely to appoint outsiders to the board, who have easy access to resources. Outside directors are always 
able to furnish valuable resources that are not readily available to the company [23]. Therefore, it is 
proposed that: 
H3: In dynamic environments, the effect of outsider director representation on organizational 
performance is positive. 
H4: With increasing dynamism, the effect of outsider director representation on organizational 
performance becomes stronger. 
According to Duncan [29], environmental complexity represents the number of the key components in 
the environment. Dess and Beard [31] define complexity as the diversity in the environment and the 
intensity of the resources. Since the organizations are interacting with too many different competitors in a 
complex environment, these environments are characterized by intense competition and mutual 
dependence [19]. According to Dess and Beard [31], the executives of the companies operating in 
complex environments are much exposed to uncertainty compared to the other companies operating in 
noncomplex environments.  
Environmental complexity leads to various demands of different groups, and organizations respond 
these demands by diversification [19]. One of the ways to cope with complexity is the inclusion of 
directors who have access to the resources. Under the conditions of complexity, organizations will prefer 
outsider directors who have links for the provision of the resources necessary for organizational activities. 
Resource dependence theory indicates that in order to buffer the effects of environmental uncertainty, 
interlocks between the companies exist for the coordination of the inter-organizational exchange of 
necessary resources [19]. The appointment of representatives of interdependent organizations in boards 
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provides access to essential resources and secures those resources through linkages to the external 
environment [19, 23]. Such directors can play an important role in disseminating information across 
organizations [42, 43], reducing costs of coordination and scanning [44], and allowing comparisons of the 
knowledge of the other organizations [45]. In line with this, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H5: In complex environments, the effect of affiliated director representation on organizational 
performance is positive.
H6: With increasing complexity, the effect of affiliated director representation on organizational 
performance becomes stronger. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample and Measurement 
The companies whose shares are publicly-traded in østanbul Stock Exchange (øSE) form the initial 
sample of this study. As of December 2009, there are 315 companies listed on øSE. The shares of the 
majority of these companies (74%) are traded in the national market, whereas the others’ shares are traded 
in secondary national market, collective products market, new economy market and watch-list companies 
market. 
In collective products market, the shares of the companies which are specialized in investment, such as 
securities investment, venture capital and real-estate investment, are traded. In addition, those companies 
which have debts to state agencies and banks, or have accumulated losses, those which did not inform the 
public about their financial statements or other information demanded by the Capital Markets Board, are 
listed on watch-list companies market. All of these companies are excluded from the sample. 
The total number of the companies, whose shares are traded in the national market, secondary national 
market and new economy market, is 255. Most of these companies have their activities in manufacturing 
industry (59,6%). Among the remaining companies, 20,8 % of them have activities in services, mainly, 
wholesale or retail trade, hotels and restaurants, information services, education-health-sports and other 
social services, transportation-communication and storage, electricity-gas and water, construction and 
public works, and mining operations. On the other hand, 19,6% of the companies provide financial 
services, such as banks, insurance, leasing and factoring companies. These companies are not included in 
the sample, since the accounting principles of their operations is different from the other companies, 
which forms a limitation for comparison with other companies. Besides, holding companies are also 
classified as financial service companies. Since holding companies consists of a variety of companies that 
have operations in different industries, they are not appropriate for the purposes of this study.  
When the financial services companies are excluded from the sample, the final sample resulted to be 
205 companies. Among these companies, the information about 80 of them is included in this study 
(coverage: 39%). These companies represent a total of 10 industries, 8 of which are manufacturing and 2 
of which are non-manufacturing. There are 67 companies that have their activities in manufacturing 
industries, and 13 companies operating in non-manufacturing industries (Table-1). 
Table 1. Sample of the Study  
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Industry Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing 67 83,75 
     Food and Beverages 12 15,0 
     Textile Products 8 10,0 
     Paper Products, Printing and Publication 8 10,0 
     Petroleum Products 5 6,25 
     Chemical Products 6 7,50 
     Other Mineral Products 9 11,25 
     Machinery and Equipment 12 15,0 
     Transportation Vehicles 7 8,75 
Non-Manufacturing 13 16,25 
     Transportation, Communication and Storage 5 6,25 
     Information Services 8 10,0 
Total 80 100 
There are a total of 534 board members of the 80 companies within the sample, who was in charge in 
year-2009. Data on individual basis was collected for each board member, from company annual reports, 
websites of the companies or other related websites. Summary descriptive statistics for board members 
within the sample are presented in Table-2. For the purposes of this research, insider directors are defined 
as the board members who are also executives of their companies, outsider directors are the independent 
board members who are unaffiliated with their companies and other companies which are affiliated with 
the company, and affiliated directors are the board members who are also the board members of other 
companies that have relations with the company. The proportions of insider, outsider and affiliated 
directors for each organization are calculated by using simple ratios (percentage of insider/outsider/
affiliated directors within the board). The dependent variable of this study is the organizational 
performance. For the measurement of organizational performance, Return on Assets (ROA) (the ratio of 
net income to total assets) for each company is calculated for the year 2009. It is observed that, boards 
within the sample are dominated by directors that are executives of other companies which are affiliated 
with the company (77,9%). Presence of outside directors in the boards still remain to be low; only 
approximately 6,4% of the sample are formed by outside directors. In the boards of 61 companies 
(76,2%), no outsider director is present. With respect to board size, average number of directors present in 
the boards is not high. Boards in the sample are formed by approximately 7 members on the average.  
Table 2. Board Characteristics 
 Frequency Percent Minimum Maximum 
Board Composition     
     Affiliated Directors 416 77,90 0 4 
     Inside Directors 84 15,73 0 7 
     Outside Directors 34 6,37 0 11 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Board Size 6,65 1,87 3 13 
In this research, the task environment is defined as the industry that the organizations operate. The 
environmental characteristics that effect the organizations vary significantly among industries [46]. 
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Therefore, the sample consists of organizations that have their operations in various industries. The 
munificence, dynamism and complexity characteristics of the industries are examined; since these 
characteristics define and conceptualize the basic features of the organizations’ task environments [47]. 
Environmental munificence is measured as the growth rate of the industry [31]. For munificence, Dess 
and Beard [31] used different measures; which are growth, in sales, price-cost margin, total employment, 
value added, or number of enterprises. Among these measures, growth in sales is the best measure that 
represents munificence, according to the results of Dess and Beard’s factor analysis [48]. Growth in sales 
was measured as the coefficient of the regression slope (ȕ), divided by the mean (Y). Industry sales data 
was measured using industry income statements for the time period of 1998-2009. 
Environmental dynamism was measured as the variance in the growth rates [31]. For the measurement 
of environmental dynamism, Dess and Beard proposed instability of, total sales, price-cost margin, 
employment and value added or the ratio of sales to the producers of the intermediary goods. For the 
measurement of dynamism, the instability of total sales was calculated as the standard deviation of the 
regression slope coefficient (ı) divided by the mean (Y), for twelfth year time period (1998-2009). 
Environmental complexity is measured as the concentration of the resources in the environment [31]. 
For the measurement of environmental complexity, Dess and Beard [31] suggested geographical 
concentration of total sales, value added, total employment and number of establishments and 
specialization ratio. However, it was not possible to access to safe data about these variables. According 
to Wiersema and Bantel [48], environmental complexity can best be conceptualized by the diversity of the 
activities undertaken by the company. Therefore, the authors measured the complexity with product 
specialization ratio. In line with this, in this study, the complexity of each organization was measured in 
terms of their product specialization. 
4. Research Findings 
Means, standard deviations and correlations of the measures are demonstrated in Table-3. Board size is 
correlated negatively with industry munificence and positively with environmental complexity. 
Correlations between industry munificence and two of the board composition variables (insider ratio and 
affiliated ratio) exist; which is positive between munificence and insider ratio and negative between 
munificence and affiliated ratio. Besides, correlations between ROA and the same board composition 
variables (insider ratio and affiliated ratio) also exist. The correlation between ROA and insider ratio is 
negative, whereas the correlation between ROA and affiliated ratio is positive.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Means 
Std. 
Dev. 
Board 
Size 
Outsider 
Ratio 
Insider 
Ratio 
Affiliated 
Ratio 
Munificence Dynamism Complexity ROA 
Board Size 6,65 1,87 1        
Outsider Ratio 0,07 0,14 .031 1       
Insider Ratio 0,17 0,24 -.200 -.080 1      
Affiliated Ratio 0,77 0,26 .172 -.388** -.866** 1     
Munificence 0,14 0,16 -.293** .048 .274* -.300** 1    
Dynamism 0,18 0,08 -.133 .002 .157 -.154 .677** 1   
Complexity 0,31 0,21 .279* .091 -.119 .059 -.203 -.194 1  
ROA --- 0,08 .109 -.132 -.278* .335** -.114 .024 -.015 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
In order to test the effects of each board composition variable on organizational performance, the data 
were analyzed with linear regression analysis. Table-4 reports the results of the regression analyses. 
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According to the results, among the board composition variables both insider ratio and affiliated ratio 
have a significant effect on ROA. The effect of insider director proportion on ROA is found out to be 
negative, whereas the effect of affiliated director proportion on ROA is found out to be positive. On the 
other hand, no significant effect is discovered between outsider director proportion and ROA. In most of 
the research on board of directors, board size is considered as a control variable. When board size is 
considered as a control variable in the relation of insider ratio with ROA, it is observed that the effect of 
insider director proportion on ROA slightly increased (ȕ = -.267, p = .019, R2 = .081) and whereas the 
effect of affiliated director proportion on ROA slightly decreased (ȕ = .326, p = .004, R2 = .115).  
Table 4. Regression Analysis – General Model (Main Effects)
Independent 
Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. R
2
Insider Ratio -.278 -2,561 .012* .078 
Outsider Ratio -.132 -1,178 .242 .017 
Affiliated Ratio   .335 3,139 .002** .112 
* Significant at the 0.05 level     ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
The effects of each board composition variable on organizational performance were analyzed 
separately, for different levels of environmental dimensions. The means of each environmental variable 
determine their level. The values above the mean represent high level, where the values below the mean 
represent low level of environmental dimensions. As demonstrated in Table-5, the results indicate some 
significant relations.  
Table 5. Regression Analysis – Effect of Different Levels of Environmental Dimensions 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 Independent 
Variables Low 
Munificence 
High 
Munificence 
Low 
Dynamism 
High 
Dynamism 
Low 
Complexity 
High 
Complexity 
Ǻ -.227 -.436 -,241 -.383 -.331 -.246 
T -1,838 -1,812 -1,806 -1,986 -2,222 -1,521 
P .071 .091 .077 .059 .032* .137 
Insider   
Ratio 
R2 .052 .190 .058 .146 .110 .060 
Ǻ -.082 -.331 .044 -.514 -.104 -.146 
T -.646 -1,314 .320 -2,873 -.663 -.888 
P .521 .210 .751 .009** .511 .381 
Outsider 
Ratio 
R2 .007 .110 .002 .264 .011 .021 
Ǻ .269 .526 .205 .604 .369 .319 
T 2,195 2,312 1,524 3,632 2,513 2,021 
P .032* .037* .134 .001** .016* .051 
Affiliated 
Ratio 
R2 .072 .276 .042 .365 .136 .102 
* Significant at the 0.05 level     ** Significant at the 0.01 level
The negative effect of insider ratio on ROA is significant, when environmental complexity is low. 
Besides, the negative effect of outsider ratio on ROA is significant, when environmental dynamism is 
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high. On the other hand, the significant effect of affiliated ratio on ROA is positive, when munificence is 
both low and high, when dynamism is high and when complexity is low. This effect is maximal, at high 
level of dynamism. 
Although the analyses reveal interesting findings, in munificent environments the effect of insider 
director representation on ROA is insignificant, when both of the munificence levels are considered. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is not supported. The effect of outsider ratio on ROA is found out to 
be insignificant in the general model. However, when environmental dynamism is high, this effect is 
negative. But, this finding also does not support the third hypothesis (H3), since it was assumed that the 
effect would be positive in dynamic environments. Lastly, the fifth hypothesis (H5) is not also supported, 
because according to the results, the effect of affiliated ratio on ROA is significant when complexity is 
low. It was hypothesized that this relation would be positive when complexity is high, however this effect 
is insignificant.  
Another regression analysis was conducted in order to test the moderating effects of environmental 
dimensions on the proposed relations. When the environmental dimensions were included in the analysis 
as moderating variables, it was found out that not only environmental munificence but also environmental 
dynamism and complexity have a significant effect on the relation between insider ratio and ROA. All of 
these effects are found out to be negative (Table-6).  
The effect of insider ratio on ROA under the conditions of environmental munificence is higher than 
the effect founded in the first model (Table-4). Although, this result indicates the moderating effect of 
environmental munificence on the relation between insider ratio and ROA, second hypothesis (H2) is not 
supported. In addition, the results indicate no significant relation between outsider ratio and ROA, when 
each of the environmental dimensions is considered. Therefore, fourth hypothesis (H4) is not also 
supported. Finally, the effect of affiliated director proportion on ROA is positive only when 
environmental dynamism is taken into consideration. The effect of affiliated director proportion on ROA 
is not significant under the conditions of complexity. This also indicates that, no support is found for sixth 
hypothesis (H6).
Table 6. Regression Analysis – Moderation Effects 
Independent Variables Standardized Coefficients t Sig. R
2
Insider Ratio * Munificence -.260 -2,378 .020* .068 
Insider Ratio * Dynamism -.290 -2,675 .009** .084 
Insider Ratio*Complexity -.278 -2,556 .013* .077 
Outsider Ratio * Munificence -.165 -1,477 .144 .027
Outsider Ratio * Dynamism -.182 -1,637 .106 .033 
Outsider Ratio * Complexity -.091 -.808 .422 .008 
Affiliated Ratio * Munificence .077 .681 .498 .006 
Affiliated Ratio * Dynamism .342 3,210 .002** .117 
Affiliated Ratio * Complexity .125 1,109 .271 .016 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.     ** Significant at the 0.01 level.
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study focused on the effect of board composition on organizational performance. This relation 
previously attracted the attention of many researchers; however the research findings were inconsistent. In 
this study, board composition was operationalized in three different ways and the effect of the three 
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dimensions of the industries in which the organizations operate, was also investigated. Although the 
findings did not provide any support for all of the proposed hypotheses, some important concluding 
remarks are driven.  
First of all, the findings indicate that different measures of board composition lead to different results. 
In the governance literature, board composition is operationalized as not fewer than 20 ways, as the 
proportions of inside, outside, independent/interdependent and affiliated directors [8]. There exists no 
optimal board composition for all organizations. Since each board member has different skills and 
knowledge, different types of board composition are required by different organizations. In this research, 
it is suggested that since organizations operating in same environment require similar resources, different 
board compositions will lead to better performance under different environmental conditions. The 
environmental characteristics which are measured in terms of munificence, dynamism and complexity 
have significant effects on some of the relations. 
Affiliated director representation in the boards positively effect organizational performance, in the 
environments with different levels of munificence, when dynamism is high and when complexity is low. 
In munificent environments, in order to outperform their rivals, organizations should seek for different 
alternatives. In such cases, affiliated directors could bring in varieties of knowledge and resources from 
their own organizations; as a consequence, this will lead the organizations to evaluate different 
alternatives more easily and select the one that best fit organizational objectives more quickly. This is also 
valid in the environments where complexity is low. In the environments where there is high level of 
dynamism; the performance of the organizations, which are more rapid than others for the acquisition of 
the necessary resources, would be higher. It would be much quicker for affiliated directors to provide such 
resources to the organization, therefore the presence of affiliated directors in these environments would 
lead better performance. In this type of environments, outsider directors might not be effective for rapid 
provision of the resources. It would be much easier to access resources from another organization which is 
affiliated. On the other hand, the findings indicate that insider director proportion in each environment is 
not preferable, the presence of insiders effect organizational performance negatively. This might be 
related to the fact that in general insider directors are involved in daily organizational activities, so that it 
is difficult for them to follow all of the developments occurring in organizational environment. This 
therefore results that organizational performance to be lower than others.  
These findings indicate that integration of environmental dimensions into the relation between board 
composition and organizational performance leads to a better understanding of the relation. As the 
findings demonstrate, the proportion of variation explained by the model (coefficient of determination - 
R2) increased with the inclusion of the environmental dimensions into the analysis. 
There are some limitations encountered in this study. First of all, the sample size should be enlarged in 
order to understand the relations better. Besides, only organizations operating in 10 different industries are 
included in the sample, other organizations operating in different industries should also be included in the 
future studies. Organizational performance is measured in terms of ROA, it would be better to employ 
other performance measures that are directly related with environment such as resource acquisition and 
volume of resources. Most of the organizations in Turkey are family business; therefore, it would also be 
appropriate to include the number of family directors in the analysis. Apart from these limitations, the 
findings of this study revealed noteworthy insights for the effect of environmental dimensions on the 
relation between board composition and organizational performance. 
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